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Abstract
Professor Volf counters the claim that religion fosters violence and that the “resurgence of religiously
legitimized violence” is a direct consequence of a “contemporary resurgence of religion.” Limiting himself to a
case-study of Christianity, he argues that the cure to social violence “is not less religion, but, in a carefully
qualified sense, more religion.” Professor Volf identifies and criticizes a number of influential arguments found
in the work of several authors, including Mark Juergensmeyer, Maurice Bloch, Regina Schwartz and Jacques
Derrida, which he believes erroneously link Christianity and violence. These arguments are organized around
four general themes: religion, monotheism, creation, and new creation. At the heart of his thesis lies the
distinction between ‘thin’ and thick’ religion. According to Professor Volf, ‘thick’ religion entails a stronger,
more conscious commitment to a faith rooted in a concrete tradition, while ‘thin’ religion entails nothing
more than a vague sense of religiosity “whose content is shaped by factors other than faith (such as national or
economical interests).” Throughout the lecture, Professor Volf contends that although ‘thin’ Christian faith
may potentially lead to violence, ‘thick’ Christian faith actually serves to create and sustain a culture of peace.
In the conclusion of his Lecture, he offers some reflections on “why misconceptions about the violent
character of Christian faith abound” in contemporary society.
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Foreword
Adam Graves
In the wake of September 11th, it was decided that this year’s Dana Boardman 
Lecture in Christian Ethics at the University of Pennsylvania (the thirty-eighth in the 
series) should address the relationship between religion and violence.  The Boardman 
Lecture was delivered by Miroslav Volf, Henry B. Wright Professor of Theology at Yale 
University Divinity School.  As a native Croatian, Professor Volf’s work grows out of his 
firsthand experience of living and teaching in Croatia during the violent ethnic/religious 
war in former Yugoslavia.  He is the author and coeditor of numerous books, including 
Work in the Spiri: Toward a Theology of Work (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1991) and The Future of Theology: Essays in Honor of Jürgen Moltmann (ed. with T. 
Kucharz and C. Krieg, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), and Exclusion and Embrace: A 
Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation (Nashville: Abingdon, 
1996).  In Exclusion and Embrace, Professor Volf tackled the immense ethical and 
theological challenges posed by the political, ethnic, and ‘religious’ conflicts which seem 
to occupy nearly every corner of today’s globe.  Owing to his combination of personal 
background and theological expertise, Professor Volf offers a unique perspective on the 
religious issues raised by the recent events of September 11th.
In his Boardman Lecture on “Christianity and Violence,” Professor Volf counters 
the claim that religion fosters violence and that the “resurgence of religiously legitimized 
violence” is a direct consequence of a “contemporary resurgence of religion” (2).  
Limiting himself to a case-study of Christianity, he argues that the cure to social violence 
“is not less religion, but, in a carefully qualified sense, more religion” (3).  Professor Volf 
identifies and criticizes a number of influential arguments found in the work of several 
authors, including Mark Juergensmeyer, Maurice Bloch, Regina Schwartz and Jacques 
Derrida, which he believes erroneously link Christianity and violence.  These arguments 
are organized around four general themes: religion, monotheism, creation, and new 
creation.  At the heart of his thesis lies the distinction between ‘thin’ and thick’ religion.  
According to Professor Volf, ‘thick’ religion entails a stronger, more conscious 
commitment to a faith rooted in a concrete tradition, while ‘thin’ religion entails nothing 
more than a vague sense of religiosity “whose content is shaped by factors other than 
faith (such as national or economical interests)” (3). Throughout the lecture, Professor 
Volf contends that although ‘thin’ Christian faith may potentially lead to violence, ‘thick’ 
Christian faith actually serves to create and sustain a culture of peace.  In the conclusion 
of his Lecture, he offers some reflections on “why misconceptions about the violent 
character of Christian faith abound” in contemporary society.  
The lecture appearing in this volume is a revised version of the lecture given on 
March 6th, 2002.
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CHRISTIANITY AND VIOLENCE
Miroslav Volf 
Henry B. Wright Professor of Theology 
Yale University Divinity School 
 
Introduction: Resurgence of Religion 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center it was not unusual 
to hear that the attack “changed everything.” “Everything” is certainly an exaggeration, but 
9/11, as the terrorist attack is sometimes called, did change a good many things, including 
our relation to religion. For the attack, in which more than 3000 lives were lost and the 
economic life of the nation was disrupted in a major way, was in part motivated by religion. 
Religion, we were led to conclude, is alive and well today, and is a force not only in private 
but also in the public lives of people around the globe.  
This is not what the mainstream sociologists of the 20th century, who followed in the 
footsteps of Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emil Durkheim, were predicting. Instead of slowly 
withering away or lodging itself quietly into the privacy of worshipers’ hearts, religion has 
emerged as an important player on the national and international scenes. It is too early to tell 
how permanent this resurgence of religion will be. The processes of secularization may well 
continue, though likely not in the older sense of an overall decline of religious observance, 
but rather in the newer sense of the diminishing influence of religion in contemporary social 
structures. Nevertheless, religion is presently alive and well on the public scene, so much so 
that a collection of essays entitled Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft (which, when 
originally published in 1994, was seen as pushing the boundaries of its discipline) has 
become obligatory reading for diplomats in many countries, Western and non-Western. 1
In many people’s minds, the reassertion of religion as a political factor has not been 
for the good. It seems that the gods have mainly terror on their minds, as the title of Mark 
Juergensmeyer’s book on the global rise of religious violence, published before 9/11, 
suggests.2 Among the intellectual elite in the Western cultural milieu the contemporary 
coupling of religion and violence feeds most decisively on the memories of the wars that 
plagued Europe from the 1560s to the 1650s, in which religion was “the burning motivation, 
the one that inspired fanatical devotion and the most vicious hatred.”3 It was these wars that 
contributed a great deal to the emergence of secularizing modernity.  
1 Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
2 Terror in the Mind of God. The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2000).
3 Scott R. Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred. Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 2. See Ronald Asch, The Thirty Years War. The 
Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1618-48 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).
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A secularizing impact of the wars of religion was felt even as far afield from everyday 
concerns as theories of knowledge are sometimes deemed to be. As Stephen Toulmin has 
argued in Cosmopolis, modernity did not emerge, as often claimed, simply as a result of its 
protagonists’ endeavor to dispel the darkness of tradition and superstition with the light of 
philosophical and scientific reason. It was not accidental that Descartes “discovered” the one 
correct method to acquire knowledge in a time when “over much of the continent … people 
had a fair chance of having their throats cut and their houses burned down by strangers who 
merely disliked their religion.”4 A new way of establishing truth “that was independent of, 
and neutral between, particular religious loyalties” seemed an attractive alternative to war 
fueled by dogmatic claims.5
As did key Enlightenment figures, many contemporaries see religion as a pernicious 
social ill that needs aggressive treatment rather than a medicine from which cure is expected. 
Did not the perpetrators of the 9/11 terrorist attack appeal to religion as the primary 
motivating force for their act? In the recent war in the Balkans, did not the Serbs fight for 
the land on which the holy sites of their religion stood? Is not difference between 
Catholicism and Protestantism at the heart of the civil war in Northern Ireland? Is not 
religion a major factor in clashes in India? The contemporary resurgence of religion seems to 
go hand in hand with the resurgence of religiously legitimized violence—at least in the public 
perception. Hence, the argument goes, it is necessary to weaken, neutralize, or outright 
eliminate religion as a factor in public life. 
In this lecture I will contest the claim that the Christian faith, as one of the major 
world religions, predominantly fosters violence, and argue that it should be seen as a 
contributor to more peaceful social environments. This may seem a bold claim. Lest I be 
misunderstood from the start, let me clarify my thesis. I will not argue that the Christian 
faith was not and does not continue to be employed to foster violence. Obviously, such an 
argument cannot be plausibly made. Not only have Christians committed atrocities and 
engaged in less egregious forms of violence during the course of their long history, but they 
have also drawn on religious convictions to justify them.6 Moreover, there are elements in 
the Christian faith, which, when taken in isolation or when excessively foregrounded, can 
plausibly be used to legitimize violence. Second, I will not argue that Christianity has been 
historically less associated with violence than other major religions. I am not sure whether 
this is or is not the case, and I am not sure how one would go about deciding the issue. I will 
leave these important but difficult questions unaddressed.  
What I will argue is that at least when it comes to Christianity the cure against 
religiously induced and legitimized violence is almost exactly the opposite of what an 
important intellectual current in the West since the Enlightenment has been suggesting. The 
4 Steven Toulmin, Cosmopolis. The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (New York: Free Press, 1990), 
17.
5 Toulmin, 70.
6 For a survey see Gottfried Maron, “Frieden und Krieg. Ein Blick in die Theologie- und 
Kirchengeschichte,” in: Glaubenskriege in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, ed. Peter Herrmann 
(Goettingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1996), 17-35. See also Karlheinz Deschner, Kriminalgeschichte 
des Christentums, 6 Vol. (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rohwolt, 1986ff) and a response to his work H. R. 
Seeliger (ed.), Kriminalizierung des Christentums? Karlheinz Deschners Kirchengeschichte auf dem 
Pruefstand (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1993).
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cure is not less religion, but, in a carefully qualified sense, more religion. I don’t mean, of 
course, that the cure for violence lies in increased religious zeal; blind religious zeal is at the 
heart of the problem. Instead, it lies in a stronger and more intelligent commitment to the 
faith as faith. In terms of how Christian faith is conceived, my thesis is this: The more we 
reduce Christian faith to vague religiosity which serves primarily to energize, heal, and give 
meaning to the business of life whose content is shaped by factors other than faith (such as 
national or economic interests), the worse off we will be. Inversely, the more the Christian 
faith matters to its adherents as faith and the more they practice it as an ongoing tradition 
with strong ties to its origins and with clear cognitive and moral content, the better off we 
will be. “Thin” but zealous practice of the Christian faith is likely to foster violence; “thick” and committed 
practice will help generate and sustain a culture of peace.7 This thesis amounts to the claim that 
approaching the issue of religion and violence by looking at the quantity of religious 
commitment—more religion, more violence, less religion, less violence—is unsophisticated 
and mistaken. The most relevant factor is, rather, the quality of religious commitments within 
a given religious tradition. 
In the present lecture I will support the above thesis by countering some influential 
arguments about the violent character of Christianity. This is only half of what I would need 
to do to make my thesis plausible, a negative half. The other, positive half would be to show 
that at Christianity’s heart, and not just at its margins, lie important resources for creating 
7 The best way to explain more closely my use of “thick” and “thin” is to compare it with usage by 
others. Clifford Geertz has is has made popular the use of the contrasting pair “thick” and “thin” 
(Interpretation of Cultures [New York: BasicBooks, 1974], 3-30). He himself has taken it over from 
Gilbert Ryle. Both use the term in the syntagm “thick” or “thin” description of the same phenomenon. A 
typical case of “thin” description is “rapidly contracting his right eyelids” and of the “thick” description 
“practicing burlesque of a friend faking a wink to deceive an innocent into thinking a conspiracy is in 
motion.” In his book Thick and thin: moral argument at home and abroad (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1994), Michael Walzer has introduced an altered sense of “thick” and “thin” as he 
applied them to moral argument. He writes, “it is not my claim to offer a thick description of moral 
argument, rather to point to a kind of argument that is itself “thick”—richly referential, culturally resonant, 
locked into a locally established symbolic system or network of meaning. “Thin” is simply a contrasting 
term” (xin1). (For a more recent and still different use of “thick” and “thin,” where these designations refer 
to “the two types of human relations,” and where “thick relations are in general our relations to the near and 
dear” and “thin relations are in general our relations to the stranger and the remote” see Avishai Margalit, 
The Ethics of Memory [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002], 7, 37f.). My use is similar to 
Walzer’s, in that, just as Walzer claims that it is the case in relation to morality, one arrives at the “thin” 
understanding and practice of the faith by abstraction from the “thick” understanding and practice. “Thick” 
for me is, for instance, exhibited by a worshiper who expresses a conviction that God is triune and 
understands this conviction to be governed by the story of Jesus Christ and to imply an obligation to act in 
certain ways; “thin” exhibited by the flashing of three fingers on the part of Serbian soldiers in what looks 
like a victory sign, but is in fact a sign of a Trinitarian faith reduced by that very act to no more than an 
empty marker of cultural difference. Or, to give an example from the USA, “thin” is when the words 
“under God” on the Pledge of Allegiance are drained of specific religious content so that they become more 
a cultural tradition than a theological assertion; “thick” is when “God” in the said phrase refers to the God 
of Jesus Christ or to Allah or to Jahwe, which would make the phrase unconstitutional under the “no 
establishment” clause (see the editorial “Taking on the pledge,” The Christian Century, July 17-30, 2002, 
5). Walzter and I, however, have different concerns. I am concerned to show how “thinning” of religious 
practice opens religious convictions to be misused to legitimize violence because it strips away precisely 
what in “thick” religious faith guards against such misuse, whereas Walzer is concern to show that morality 
is “thick” from the beginning and that the “thin” morality as universal always resides within the “thick” as 
particular (Walzer, 4).
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and sustaining a culture of peace.8 In the past, scholars have argued in a variety of ways that 
the Christian faith fosters violence. I will engage four arguments which, in my estimation, go 
to the heart of the matter.9
1. Religion 
The first argument for the violent character of Christianity claims that religions are 
by nature violent, and that the Christian faith, being a religion, is therefore also by nature 
violent. Mark Juergensmeyer’s Terror in the Mind of God rests on such a reading of religion. A 
central reason why violence has accompanied religion’s renewed political presence, he 
argues, has to do with “the nature of religious imagination, which always has had the 
propensity to absolutize and to project images of cosmic war.”10 Cosmic war is waged not 
for its own sake but for the sake of peace, of course. Precisely as a phenomenon at whose 
core lies cosmic war, religion has been “order restoring and life affirming.”11 But if in its 
pursuit of peace religion is not to leave a trail of blood and tears, it cannot be left to its own 
devices. It needs “the temper of rationality and fair play that Enlightenment values give to 
civil society.”12 Religion qua religion is violent. To have a socially positive role, it needs to be 
redeemed by Enlightenment values.  
The argument that a religion which counts among its great teachers Augustine, 
Thomas Aquinas, and Luther (to name just a few great theological minds) would need to 
learn to be “rational” from Enlightenment thinkers, betrays a rather narrow understanding 
of “rationality.” But at least such an account of rationality is plausible. Implausible is, 
however, the claim that a religion which counts St. Francis among its greatest saints does not 
have resources of its own to learn about fair play but must borrow them from 
Enlightenment thinkers. The pressure to make such implausible claims comes from 
“thinning” Christian convictions to general religious beliefs and then placing images of 
cosmic war at the heart of these. In the process, everything specific to the Christian faith has 
been lost. 
Whereas Juergensmeyer asserts that religion is inherently violent by appealing to the 
images of the cosmic war which lies allegedly at its heart, Maurice Bloch argues for the same 
assertion by offering a general theory of religion. In his book Prey into Hunter he argues that 
8 See my Exclusion and Embrace (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996).
9 There are other arguments for the same thesis as well, some of which I will address indirectly. 
One is based on the combination of the claims about God’s omnipotence, omniscience, and implacable 
justice, for instance. A belief in an all powerful God who sees everything and wills the punishment of every 
transgression is central to the Christian faith, the proponents of the argument claim, and is bound to lead to 
violence. Another argument for the violent character of the Christian faith is based on the authoritarian 
character of every revealed religion. Adherents of a religion resting on the irrational authority of revelation 
will tend to adjudicate disputes not trough rational means and compromise but through assertion of 
irrational authority. Space does not allow me to address these and other arguments. But my comments 
below go a significant way toward indirectly addressing them.
10 Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, 242.
11 Ibid., 159. 
12 Ibid., 243.
7
the “irreducible core of the ritual process” involves “a marked element of violence or ... of 
[a] conquest ... of the here and now by the transcendental.”13 He explains, 
In the first part of the ritual the here and now is simply left behind by the move 
towards the transcendental. This initial movement represents the transcendental as 
supremely desirable and the here and now as of no value. The return is different. In 
the return the transcendental is not left behind but continues to be attached to those 
who made the initial move in its direction; its value is not negated. Secondly, the 
return to the here and now is really a conquest of the here and now by the 
transcendental.14
This return from the transcendental sphere motivated by the goal of conquest, Bloch 
continues, explains “the often-noted fact that religion so easily furnishes an idiom of 
expansionist violence to people in a whole range of societies, an idiom which, under certain 
circumstances, becomes a legitimation for actual violence.”15 
Let us assume that Bloch has analyzed the core of the ritual process correctly. The 
question still remains whether one should look at the core of the ritual process, stripped of 
the texture as well as of the larger context that a concrete religion gives it, in order to 
understand the relation of religions to violence. Here is a thought experiment. Imagine that 
the first part of the ritual—the leaving of the here and now by the move toward the 
transcendental—were understood by a religion as the death of the self to her own self-
centered desires and as her entry into a transcendental space of harmonious peace. And 
suppose that the religion stipulates that the second part of the ritual – the conquest of the 
here and now by the transcendental – must be achieved in a peaceful way, consistent with 
the content of the transcendental. If the formal structure of ritual were filled in with this 
content, would such a religion serve as “a legitimation of actual violence”? Would not the 
“conquest,” if successful, be precisely the victory of the “transcendental” peace over the 
violence of the here and now?  
As you are certainly aware, such a religion need not be imagined as hypothetically 
existing. For what I have asked you to imagine is precisely how the Christian faith, at least in 
some of its important strands, understands itself and its initiation ritual, baptism. Bloch 
engages the Christian faith directly, and envisages a possibility of it not underwriting 
violence. But in his account such a possibility is predicated on Christianity’s “refusal of the 
second phase of rebounding violence, that is, a refusal of the conquest of external vitality 
which is therefore ultimately a refusal to continue with earthly life.”16 The Apostle Paul’s 
Christianity, he believes, is an example of such a refusal—or rather, an example of a half-
hearted refusal, since Paul also undertook “prudent organization of a well-organized church 
firmly embedded in the continuing practical and political world.”17 
13 Maurice Bloch, Prey into Hunter. The Politics of Religious Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1992), 4-5.
14 Ibid.,5.
15 Ibid., 6.
16 Ibid., 90-91.
17 Ibid., 94.
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Yet, a more careful study of the Apostle will show that he advocated neither a full-
fledged nor a half-hearted refusal of the “conquest.” Explaining the significance of baptism 
for earthly life he writes, “Therefore we have been buried with him by baptism into death, so 
that, just as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we might walk in 
the newness of life” (Romans 6:4). Paul understands walking in the “newness of life” as 
imitatio Christi and therefore as “repetition” of the transcendental sphere in the here and now. 
So he is after “conquest.” But equally significant as the conquest itself, is the character of the 
conquest, for conquering in the right way is the only way to conquer. Since Christ died in 
self-giving love for the godless, Paul must affirm a kind of non-violent conquest of the here 
and now. To paraphrase Paul’s famous summary of Christian life in the world (Romans 
12:21), to seek to conquer evil with evil is to be conquered by evil; evil can be overcome only 
with good.   
Will Christianity understood as a peaceful conquest of a violent world by the God of 
peace foster violence? One could argue that any victory of the “transcendental” over the 
here and now amounts to violence. But if non-coercive victory of peace over violence is 
itself implicated in violence, then one may well wonder whether the notion of violence has 
been hopelessly muddled. Put differently, one would need to show why “violence” 
understood in such a way is not desirable rather than objectionable.  
As applied to Christianity, the victory of the “transcendental” over the here and now 
will be violent only if the notion of the “transcendental” is stripped of its particular content 
and infused with the values of the “here and now” around which conflicts rage. This often 
happens when Christian faith is employed to legitimize violence. God is declared to be on 
our side and we see ourselves as soldiers of God, so that the earthly goals acquire a 
“transcendent” aura and the struggle for them becomes a religious duty. One may describe 
this as inverse projection—not the projection of what humans deem supremely valuable 
onto a heavenly screen, which 19th century critics of religion deplored, but the projection of 
heavenly values onto earthly goods. The second projection is more dangerous because the 
first generates religiously sanctioned passivity in the context of oppression and suffering 
whereas the second generates religiously sanctioned violence in the context of struggle for 
scarce goods. Such a projection of transcendent values onto earthly goods can succeed, 
however, only if Christian faith is illegitimately stripped of its “thick” content so as to be 
able to support an engagement in a struggle that was already under way and carried out for 
other than religious reasons and by means other than those sanctioned by the religion.  
 
2. Monotheism 
Other scholars, like Regina Schwartz in her book The Curse of Cain: The Violent Legacy 
of Monotheism, try to argue for the Christian faith’s complicity in violence by pointing not to 
the general features of the Christian faith as religion, but to one of its characteristic 
components. Along with Judaism and Islam, Christianity is a monotheistic religion, and 
therefore, Schwartz argues, an exclusive and violent religion. “Whether as singleness (this God 
against the others) or totality (this is all the God there is), monotheism abhors, reviles, 
rejects, and ejects whatever it defines as outside its compass.”18 Given that the belief in one 
18 Regina Schwartz, The Curse of Cain: The Violent Legacy of Monotheism (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1997), 63.
9
God “forges identity antithetically,” it issues in a mistaken notion of identity (“we are ‘us’ 
because we are not ‘them’”) and contributes to violent practice (“we can remain ‘us’ only if 
we obliterate ‘them’”).  
In addition, monotheism imports the category of universal “truth” into the religious 
sphere. Jakov Jukic, a Croatian sociologist of religion, has noted that this fact lies at the heart 
of monotheism’s exclusivity. To believe that there is only one God means to believe in the 
only true God. Moreover, since such a claim to truth must be universal, it is inescapably 
public. Universal public claims cause strife when they encounter opposing claims, of either a 
particular or a universal sort. For this reason, too, monotheism is bound to have a violent 
legacy, the argument goes.19 “We,” the faithful, have on our side the one true God, and stand 
in opposition to “them,” the infidels and renegades. 
This argument should be taken seriously. And yet it is not clear that an affirmation of 
divine oneness as such leads to violence. Does not the monotheistic claim to universal truth 
work also against the tendency to divide people into “us” and “them”? If one accepts the 
belief in one God, in an important sense everybody is “in,” and everybody is “in” precisely 
on the same terms. True, “being in on the same terms” may feel like violence if you don’t 
want to be “in” or you want to be “in” on different terms. But take monotheism away, and 
the division and violence between “us” and “them” hardly disappears, and if “us” or “them” 
are religious, they each will appeal to their good to wage war. This is in fact what happens 
whether religion is monotheistic or tribal. In a polytheistic context violence may reassert 
itself with even more force, because it will necessarily be justified by locally legitimized or on 
arbitrary preferences, against which, in the absence of a divinity which overarches the 
parties, there now can be no higher court of appeal. Even if monotheism is taken vaguely 
and abstractly as belief in one God without further qualification, it is not clear that it is likely 
to generate more violence than polytheism or atheism.  
None of the monotheist religions espouses such a vague and abstract monotheism. 
Specifically Christian monotheism contains a further important pressure against violence, 
especially violence caused by self-enclosed and exclusive identities of the type criticized by 
Schwartz. For Christian monotheism is of a Trinitarian kind.20 What difference does 
Trinitarianism make?21 One of the socially most important aspects of the doctrine of the 
Trinity concerns notions of identity. To believe that the one God is the Father, the Son, and 
the Holy Spirit, is to believe that the identity of the Father, for instance, cannot be 
understood apart from the Son and the Holy Spirit. The Father’s identity is from the start 
defined by the Son and the Spirit, and therefore it is not undifferentiated and self-enclosed. 
One cannot say without qualification that the Father is not the Son or the Spirit because to 
be the Father means to have the Son and the Spirit present in one. The same holds true, of 
course, of the Son and the Spirit in relation to the Father and one another.  
19 Jakov Jukic, Lica i Maske Svetoga. Ogledi iz drustvene religiologije (Faces and Masks of the 
Holy) (Zagreb: Krscanska sadasnjost, 1997), 242f.
20 For a critique of Schwartz along these lines see Miroslav Volf, “Jehovah on Trial,” Christianity 
Today (April 27, 1998), 32-35.
21 For the following see Miroslav Volf, “’The Trinity is Our Social Program’: The Doctrine of the 
Trinity and the Shape of Social Engagement” Modern Theology 14:3 (July 1998): 403-23. 
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Moreover, the divine persons as non-self-enclosed identities are understood by the 
Christian tradition to form a perfect communion of love. The persons give themselves to 
each other and receive themselves from each other in love. None has to wrest anything from 
others, none has to impose anything on others, and none needs to secure himself from the 
incursions of others. Far from being a life of violence, the life of the divine being is 
characterized by mutually uncoerced and welcomed generosity. 
It would be difficult to argue that such monotheism fosters violence. Instead, in 
Maurice Bloch’s terminology, it grounds peace here and now in the “transcendental” realm, 
in the love and peacefulness of the divine being. The argument for the inherent violence of 
Christianity’s monotheism works only if one illegitimately reduces the “thick” religious 
description of God to naked oneness and then postulates such abstract oneness to be of 
decisive social significance. I do not dispute that such reduction in fact happens within the 
Christian community. I do contend, however, that this is a sign that the Christian faith has 
not been taken seriously enough because non-religious values have taken precedence, rather 
than that it is inherently violent.   
 
3. Creation 
So far I have argued that Christian faith may generate violence in its “thin” but not 
in its “thick” form—when a “thick” character of divine being’s differentiated and complex 
identity is reduced to an undifferentiated “One” and when divine engagement with the world 
to make it a world of harmonious peace is rendered as a generalized “conquest.” But what 
about the argument that some very “thick” and “concrete” Christian convictions generate 
violence? Central here are the convictions about the world’s creation and redemption. 
It is a basic Christian claim that God created the world. In her influential book Sexism 
and God-Talk Rosemary Redford Ruether starts with the observation that in the Hebrew 
Bible, the creator is like an artisan working on material outside his own nature. God does so, 
she argues, by “a combination of male seminal and cultural power (word-act) that shapes it 
‘from above’.”22 In such an account, creation is a result of an imposition of form on formless 
matter from outside by an alien force. Hence creation is an act of violence.  
So what is wrong with this account of creation? Everything—almost. Even if we 
assume that creation is best described as “forming” pre-existing material, one would have to 
argue that this material is “something,” and that it is a specific kind of something which 
deserves respect. But it is not clear at all that chaos, which according to this account of 
creation God formed, is a “something.” And if the chaos were a “something,” why would it 
not be something analogous to a boulder from which an artisan can fashion a sculpture? For 
all the sparks flying off his chisel, Michelangelo working on “David” can hardly be described 
as perpetrating violence. For the activity of “forming” to do violence, the entity that is 
formed must possess an integrity of its own that demands respect. If someone were to 
smash Michelangelo’s “David” into pieces of granite, this would be an act of violence.  
On the whole, however, the Christian tradition has not understood creation as 
“forming.” Instead, it has underscored that God the creator is not a demiurge working on 
22 Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1983), 77.
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pre-existing matter; God created ex nihilo, out of nothing. The consequences of this 
understanding of creation for its putative violent character are significant. As Rowan 
Williams puts it in On Christian Theology, when we say that God creates we do not mean that 
God “imposes a definition” but that God “creates an identity.” He continues, “Prior to 
God’s word there is nothing to impose on.”23 From this it follows that creation is not the 
exercise of an alien power, indeed that it is not an exercise of power at all, understood in the 
usual sense. Williams writes, 
Power is exercised by x over y; but creation is not power, because it is not exercised 
on anything. We might, of course, want to say that creation presupposes a divine 
potentiality, or resourcefulness, or abundance of active life; and ‘power’ can 
sometimes be used in those senses. But what creation emphatically isn’t is any kind 
of imposition or manipulation: it is not God imposing on us divinely willed roles 
rather than the ones we ‘naturally’ might have, or defining us out of our own system 
into God’s … And this implies that the Promethean myth of humanity struggling 
against God for its welfare and interests makes no sense: to be a creature cannot be 
to be a victim of an alien force.24 
Creation, then, is not a violent act. Indeed, one may even argue that short of having a 
doctrine of creation, relationships between entities in the world, especially human beings, 
will be necessarily violent.25 If identities are not created, then boundaries between identities 
must be emerging out of interchanges between these entities. And these interchanges 
themselves must be described as violent, since boundaries, precisely because they are always 
contested, must be described arbitrarily from a vantage point that transcends either of the 
contesting entities. Given scarce resources, boundaries will always be the products of power 
struggles, even if those power struggles take the form of negotiations. Moreover, no appeals 
for arbitration between the contending parties can be made to something which ultimately 
stands outside the power struggle.  
 
4. New Creation 
If creation is not a violent act, Christian convictions about creation do not generate 
violence—provided, of course, that they are not stripped of their specific texture and 
reduced to the formula “x forms y which possesses integrity of its own,” so that they can be 
employed in ways contrary to their inner logic. But what about the eschatological new creation?
What about God’s activity to redeem creation from consequences of sin? Clearly, the new 
creation is not creatio ex nihilo (out of nothing), but creatio ex vetere (out of old creation), and 
that “old” and “sinful” creation does possess an integrity of its own (even if it is an integrity 
in tension with its true character), and can and does assert its will over against God. In 
redeeming the world, God intervenes into the existing sinful world in order to transform it 
into a world of perfect love. Is this intervention not violent and does it therefore not 
generate violence on the part of human beings? 
23 Rowan Williams, On Christian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 68.
24 Ibid., 68f.
25 See John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1990).
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The most radical critique of redemptive divine engagement as violent and violence 
inducing comes from post-structuralist thinkers. For them, any determinacy of the goal to be 
achieved by divine transformation of this world and any specificity about the agent of 
transformation already breeds violence. On their account, for what needs to come, in contrast 
to what is, not to be violent, it must always remain completely other and cannot be expressed 
as “onto-theological or teleo-eschatological program or design.”26 As John Caputo, speaking 
in a voice of his teacher, Jacques Derrida, puts it, “if the Messiah ever actually showed up… 
that would ruin everything.”27 Any and every Messiah is problematic because by necessity he 
would exclude something or someone. Hence the only acceptable goal of desirable change is 
“absolute hospitality,” a posture of welcoming the stranger without any preconditions, just 
as the only acceptable engagement to achieve it is “radical and interminable, infinite … 
critique.”28 
“Absolute hospitality” seems generous and peaceful, until one remembers that 
unrepentant perpetrators and their unhealed victims would then have to sit around the same 
table and share a common home without adequate attention to the violation that has taken 
place. The idea ends up too close for comfort to the Nietzschean affirmation of life, in 
which a sacred “yes” is pronounced to all that is and “But thus I willed it,” is said of all that 
was, with all the small and large horrors of history.29 Absolute hospitality would in no way 
amount to absence of violence. To the contrary, it would enthrone violence precisely under 
the guise of non-violence because it would leave the violators unchanged and the 
consequences of violence unremedied. Hospitality can be absolute only once the world has 
been made into a world of love in which each person would be hospitable to all. In the 
world of injustice, deception, and violence, hospitality can be only conditional—even if the 
will to hospitality and the offer of hospitality remain unconditional. 
Transformation of the world of violence into a world of love cannot take place by 
means of absolute hospitality. It takes radical change, and not just an act of indiscriminate 
acceptance, for the world to be made into a world of love. The Christian tradition has tied 
this change with the coming of the Messiah, the crucified and the resurrected One, whose 
appearance in glory is still awaited. Is this messianic intervention violent? Does it sanction 
human violence? The answer is easy when it comes to the Messiah’s first coming. Jesus 
Christ did not come into the world in order to conquer evildoers through an act of violence, 
but to die for them in self-giving love and thereby reconcile them to God.  The outstretched 
arms of the suffering body on the cross define the whole of Christ’s mission. He condemned 
the sin of humanity by taking it upon himself; and by bearing it, he freed humanity from its 
power and restored their communion with God. Though suffering on the cross is not all 
Christ did, the cross represents the decisive criterion for how all his work is to be 
understood.  
26 Jacques Derrida, Spectres of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New 
International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Rutledge: New York, 1994), 75.
27 John Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1997), 74.
28 Derrida, Spectres of Marx, 90.
29 See Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in The Portable Nietzsche, transl. Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books, 1954), 139, 253.
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Does the belief in the Crucified generate violence? Beginning at least with 
Constantine’s conversion, the followers of the Crucified have perpetrated gruesome acts of 
violence under the sign of the cross. Over the centuries, the seasons of Lent and Holy Week 
were for the Jews a time of fear and trepidation; Christians have perpetrated some of the 
worst pogroms as they remembered the crucifixion of Christ for which they blamed the 
Jews. Muslims too associate the cross with violence; crusaders’ rampages were undertaken 
under the sign of the cross.  
However, an unbiased reading of the story of Jesus Christ gives no warrant for such 
perpetration of violence.  The account of his death in 1 Peter sums up the witness of the 
whole New Testament well: “For to this you have been called, because Christ also suffered 
for you, leaving you an example, so that you should follow in his steps. He committed no 
sin, and no deceit was found in his mouth. When he was abused, he did not return abuse; 
when he suffered, he did not threaten; but he entrusted himself to the one who judges justly. 
He himself bore our sins in his body on the cross, so that, free from sins, we might live for 
righteousness” (2:21-24). If there is a danger in the story of the cross in relation to violence, 
it is the danger that it might teach simply to acquiesce to being mistreated by others, not the 
danger of inciting one to mistreat others. Whenever violence was perpetrated in the name of 
the cross, the cross was depleted of its “thick” meaning within the larger story of Jesus 
Christ and “thinned” down to a symbol of religious belonging and power—and the blood of 
those who did not belong flowed as Christians transmuted themselves from would-be 
followers of the Crucified to imitators of those who crucified him.  
Finally, what about the Messiah who is still to come in glory? He will come with 
grace for his followers. But does not the book of Revelation portray him as a Rider on a 
white horse whose “eyes are like a flame of fire,” whose robe was “dipped in blood,” from 
whose “mouth comes a sharp sword with which to strike down nations” and who is coming 
to “thread in the wine press of the fury of the wrath of God the Almighty” (19:11-16)? Some 
New Testament scholars have attempted to re-interpret the Rider so as to make him fit the 
generally non-violent stance of the New Testament. What is right about such efforts is that 
in Revelation the martyrs are the true victors so that, paradoxically, the “Beast’s” victory over 
them is their victory over the “Beast.” In this they mirror Jesus Christ, the slaughtered Lamb, 
who conquered his enemies precisely by his sacrificial death.30 
Yet, the Rider is not simply the Lamb; he is the Lamb in his function as the final 
judge. But why is the final judgment necessary? Without it, we would have to presume that 
all human beings, no matter how deeply steeped in evil they are, will either eventually 
succumb to the lure of God’s love or, if they don’t, willingly embrace not only the evil they 
do but the destructive impact of evil upon their own lives. This belief is not much more than 
a modern superstition, borne out of inability to look without flinching into the “heart of 
darkness.” True, evil is self-contradictory and, if unchecked, is bound to self-destruct. But 
evildoers are so much “better” as evildoers, the better they are at knowing how to keep 
making themselves thrive while wrecking havoc on others. No doubt, goodness can and 
does overcome evil. But the power of evil rests in great part in the fact that the more one 
does evil the thicker the shield becomes that protects the evil from being overcome by good. 
The book of Revelation rightly refuses to operate with the belief that all evil will either be 
30 See Richard Bauckham, The Theology of the Book of Revelation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 74, 90.
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overcome by good or self-destruct. It therefore counts with the possibility of divine violence 
against the persistent and unrepentant evildoer. Those who refuse redemption from violence 
to love by the means of love will be, of necessity, excluded from the world of love. 
How should we understand this possible divine violence? In the context of the 
whole Christian faith, it is best described as a symbolic portrayal of the final exclusion of 
everything that refuses to be redeemed by God’s suffering love. Will God finally exclude 
some human beings? Not necessarily. I called the divine “violence” “possible.” For it is 
predicated on human refusal to be made into a loving person and therefore to be admitted 
into the world of love. Will some people refuse? I hope not—and the Bible along with the 
best of the Christian tradition has never affirmed with certainty that some will refuse and 
therefore be excluded.31
It is possible (though not necessary) that the coming about of the new creation will 
require divine violence or exclusion of what is contrary to the world of perfect love. The 
crucial question for our purposes is whether this possible divine violence at the end of 
history sanctions actual human violence in the middle of it? The response that resounds 
throughout the New Testament, including the book of Revelation, is a loud and persistent 
“No!” Though imitating God is the height of human holiness, there are things which only 
God may do. One of them is to deploy violence. Christians are manifestly not to gather 
under the banner of the Rider on the white horse, but to take up their crosses and follow the 
Crucified. If they were to do otherwise, once again, they would be involved in “thinning” out 
a “thick” element of faith and making a mischievous use of it. They would be arrogating for 
themselves what God has reserved only for himself, to transpose the divine action from the 
end-time to a time in which God explicitly refrains from deploying violence in order to make 
repentance possible, and, finally, to transmute the possibility of violence into an actuality. A 
“thick” reading of Christian eschatological convictions will not sanction human violence; to 
the contrary, it will resist it. 
 
Conclusion 
Let me underscore one more time that my point in this lecture was not that the 
Christian faith has not been used to legitimize violence, or that there are no elements in the 
Christian faith on which such uses plausibly build. It was rather that neither the character of 
the Christian faith (its being a religion of a monotheist type) nor some of its most 
fundamental convictions (such as that God created the world and is engaged in redeeming it) 
are violence inducing. The Christian faith is misused when it is employed to underwrite 
violence.  
How does such misuse happen and how should we prevent it? If we strip Christian 
convictions of their original and historic cognitive and moral content and reduce faith to a 
cultural resource endowed with a diffuse aura of the sacred, we are likely to get religiously 
legitimized and inspired violence in situations of conflict. If we nurture people in historic 
Christian convictions that are rooted in its sacred texts, we will likely get militants for peace, 
if anything. This, I think, is a result not only of a careful examination of the inner logic of 
31 On the important distinction between hope for and belief in the universal salvation see Hans Urs 
von Balthasar, Dare We Hope That All Men will be Saved?, trans., David Kipp and Lothar Krauth (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988).
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Christian convictions; it is also borne by a careful look at actual Christian practice. As R. 
Scott Appleby has argued in his book The Ambivalence of the Sacred, on the basis of case 
studies, contrary to a widespread misconception, religious people play a positive role in the 
world of human conflicts and contribute to peace not when they “moderate their religion or 
marginalize their deeply held, vividly symbolized, and often highly particular beliefs,” but 
rather “when they remain religious actors.”32 
In conclusion, let me briefly address the question as to why misconceptions about 
the violent character of Christian faith abound. I have already given part of the answer: 
Christians have used and continue to use their faith to legitimize violence they deem 
necessary to deploy. Misconceptions of the Christian faith mirror widespread misbehavior of 
Christians; and misbehavior of Christians rests on misconstruals of their own faith, on 
“thinning” of its “thick” and original elements.33 But there is more. For one can easily show 
that the majority of Christians—and the majority of religious folks in general—are non-
violent citizens, peace-lovers, peace makers, some even peace activists, and are such precisely 
for religious reasons. The purveyors of violence who seek religious legitimation are 
statistically a minority among Christians.  
So why is the contrary opinion widespread? Reasons are many. What Avishai 
Margalit writes about ethnic belonging applies equally well to religion. “It takes one 
cockroach found in your food to turn the most otherwise delicious meal into a bad 
experience…It takes 30 to 40 ethnic groups who are fighting one another to make the 1,500 
or more significant ethnic groups in the world who live more or less peacefully look bad.”34 
One may describe this as self-inflation of the negative, the tendency of the evil to loom larger 
than the comparatively much larger good.  
This general tendency is strengthened in the modern world whose information flows 
are so pervasively dominated by mass media. Consider the following contrast. The Serbian 
paramilitary who rapes Muslim women with a cross around his neck has made it into the 
headlines and is immortalized in books on religions violence. Katarina Kruhonja, a medical 
doctor from Osijek, Croatia, and a recipient of the alternative Nobel prize for her peace 
initiatives, remains relatively unknown, not to mention the motivation for her work, which is 
thoroughly religious. As she writes, she became a peace activist when, during the Serbian 
shelling of Osijek, the re-centering of her own self on the crucified Christ “freed [her] will” 
and “she was able to resist the power of exclusion and the logic of war.”35 We know little 
about people like Ms. Kruhonja partly because the success of their work demands low 
visibility. But our unawareness of them has significantly to do with the character of mass-
media communication in a market-driven world. Violence sells, so viewers get to see 
violence, without qualms about a disproportion between represented and actual violence.  
32 Appleby, Ambivalence of the Sacred, 16.
33 Michael Sells’ account of religion’s relation to genocide in Bosnia (The Bridge Betrayed: 
Religion and Genocide in Bosnia [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996]) rests on an extremely 
“thin” account of the Christian faith; it functions more like a cultural resource with little connection to its 
origins than as a living faith committed to the sacred scriptures and the best of the tradition. The “thinning” 
was, of course, not undertaken by him, but by people he studied. 
34 Margalit, The Ethics of Memory, 100.
35 Personal communication.
16
The mass media create reality, but they do so by building on the proclivities of 
viewers. Why does the Serbian paramilitary rapist seem more “interesting” than Ms. 
Kruhonja? And why are we prone to conclude from the cross he is wearing around his neck 
that his religious faith is implicated in the acts, whereas it would never occur to us to 
conclude from the ring on his finger that the institution of marriage is to blame? Religion is 
more associated with violence than with peace in the public imagination partly because the 
public is fascinated with violence. We, the peace-loving citizens of nations whose tranquility 
is secured by effective policing, are insatiable observers of violence. And as voyeurs, we 
show ourselves as vicarious participants in the very violence we outwardly abhor. We are 
particularly drawn to religious violence because we have, understandably, a strong interest in 
exposing hypocrisy, especially of a religious kind. Put the two factors together—inner 
deployment of violence and delight in exposure—and it looks like we want to hear of 
religious people’s engagement in violence partly because we ourselves are violent but expect 
them to act otherwise.  
If we were more self-critical about our own hidden violent proclivities and more 
suspicious about the presentation of violence in media, we might observe on the religious 
landscape not just eruptions of violence but a widespread and steady flow of work that 
religious people do to make our world into a more peaceful place. Our imagination would 
then not be captured, for instance, with religion as a motivating force for a dozen or so not 
particularly religiously zealous terrorists who destroyed the Twin Towers. Instead, we would 
be impressed with the degree to which religion served as a source of solace and orientation 
for the majority of Americans in a time of crisis, with the motivation it gave to many of them 
to help the victims, to protect Muslim co-religionists from stereotyping, and to build bridges 
between religious cultures estranged on account of violence triggered largely by non-religious 
motives. It is these anonymous people who acted out of the true spirit of Christian faith.  
 
